October 17, 2014

Edouard Machery and Jesse Prinz on concepts

In this video the following general issues are discussed:
1) Whether or not psychologists and philosophers’ talk of concepts are based on different concepts of the very term concept—that is, for example, whether or not the project of accounting for the building blocks of thoughts and the project of explaining our categorization capacities amount to two unrelated projects
2) Whether the problem of the semantics of concepts—as philosophers theorize about it—and the mental representations that psychologists are interested in when trying to account for categorization processes can be explained in terms of the distinction between concepts and their vehicles
3) What it is to have a concept according to leading psychological theories of concepts
4) Jerry Fodor’s Informational Atomism as an alternative to psychological theories
5) The thesis that it is wrong for psychologists to pursue the development of a single general theory of concepts because the class of concepts is not a natural class, but, instead, a heterogeneous one
6) The theory that psychologists would be better off if they abandoned the notion of concept from psychological explanation and focused, instead, on the theoretical constructs of prototypes, exemplars and theories
7) Whether or not current psychological theories of concepts should be better viewed as part of a common theoretical framework, rather than as independent competing theories
8) An empiricist proposal to the problem of the format of concepts
9) The role of modal and amodal representations in thinking and some available evidence from Neuroscience

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jabZrl2035Y&feature=youtu.be

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